The market for melons: Cournot competition with unobservable qualities by Argenton, Cédric
The market for melons: Cournot competition
with unobservable qualities
Revised version of SSE/EFI Working Paper No. 617 (December 2005)
Cédric Argenton
Stockholm School of Economics∗
May 8, 2006
Abstract
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stant marginal costs. They compete in quantities on a market where
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diﬀerential is large, the ﬁrms’ output levels are not always strategic
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11 Introduction
With summer comes the time of relishing those ﬂavorful and refreshing mel-
ons which you ﬁnd at your local marketplace. Well, they are not always
ﬂavorful, are they? As a matter of fact, it is not uncommon to get dis-
appointed with a gourd which looked particularly enticing at the time of
purchase. If only you remembered the brand name on the sticker (possibly)
aﬃxed to the last one you ate, which you particularly savored, but you don’t!
That would not be a problem if your local seller consistently supplied mel-
ons from the same source but sellers typically don’t. They very often adjust
their inventory in accordance with the availaibility, characteristics and prices
of the diﬀerent products sold on wholesale markets. Often, retailers sell dif-
ferent batches of a given fruit or vegetable at the same price, indepently of
their origin; in supermarkets, cases are just stacked and only the curious
and unhurried shoppers pay attention to the slight diﬀerences in the boxes’
appearance, wondering whether they should act upon this information, and
dig the pile or not.
This description makes clear that melons are experience goods, whose
quality is not observable at the time of purchase. This quality is also subject
to some variation at the retail level. Although we all have a friend who
claims to know how to choose a good melon, it is clear that most of us face a
lottery in doing so. In these circumstances, our willingness to pay might well
depend upon the features of this lottery. We here make the assumption that
the quantity demanded is linear in the average quality, a magnitude that can
often be observed or infered by consumers. (Indeed, by word-of-mouth, one
generally gets an idea of the worth of the season’s harvest.)
Abstracting from production and retailing details, we study a game in
which two producers of some variants of a given good have to decide about
the quantity they will bring to the market on which their undistinguishable
products are sold. Given these quantities and the corresponding average
quality, which consumers observe or infer, the market is cleared by setting
the price so as to equate demand with supply. In eﬀect, the two producers
compete àl aC o u r n o twith given but unobservable qualities when consumers
have correct beliefs regarding the average quality in all circumstances. We
attempt at characterizing the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game,
which is a generalization of the standard Cournot game.
The existence of an unobserved diﬀerence in quality introduces an addi-
tional eﬀect into the Cournot model. When a producer considers an increase
2i nt h eq u a n t i t yh eo rs h eb r i n g st ot h em a r k e t ,h eo rs h em u s ta n t i c i p a t e
not only that the market price will decrease along the current demand curve
but also that the average quality will change, shifting the demand curve al-
together. The high-quality producer thus has an incentive to produce more
than the typical Cournot quantity, while the low-quality producer is led to
produce less. If the marginal cost of production does not increase too quickly
with quality, in equilibrium the high-quality producer produces more than
the low-quality producer, even if she faces higher costs. This is the case, for
instance, whenever quality is determined by an initial investment aﬀecting
the ﬁxed cost but not the variable cost of production. In a sense, in this
situation, there is favorable, or advantageous, selection. More generally, the
strategic behavior of the producers mitigates adverse-selection phenomena of
the type described by Akerlof (1970). In particular, it is easy to come up
with examples where the only competitive equilibrium involves unraveling of
the market for "lemons", whereas on our market for melons, for moderate
cost diﬀerentials, high-quality products continue being supplied, sometimes
on a high scale.
Because of this feature of quantity choice under asymmetric informa-
tion, there are instances in which consumers would prefer to face two un-
equally able producers rather than two identical producers displaying the
(unweighted) average level of ability. That is, assuming that melon produc-
ers can be ranked on a linear quality scale, consumers could prefer their
local market being supplied by a ﬁrst-class producer along with a third-class
producer to having the certainty of buying a second-class melon, for in equi-
librium the average quality will increase more than the price.
At the same time, the unobserved diﬀerence in quality have the potential
to give rise to surprising outcomes. Large quality diﬀerentials can produce a
non-monotonic best-response curve for the low-quality ﬁrm, and a discontin-
uous curve for the high-quality ﬁrm. That can lead to the non-existence of
an equilibrium in pure strategies. Even in cases where the quality diﬀeren-
tial is small and ﬁrms’ programs are well-behaved, up to three pure-strategy
equilibria may co-exist, thus raising an equilibrium selection problem.
Importantly, our setting requires that goods be undistinguishable to the
eyes of the potential buyers. Thus, either the legal system does not support
proprietary brands (as in the important case of counterfeiting), or the costs
of establishing or maintaining such brands are prohibitive.
W ed on o tw a n tt oc l a i mt h a tam o d e lw h e r eg o o d sa r eu n d i s t i n g u i s h -
able and producers do not set their price is general, although we believe
3that some concentrated agricultural or mineral product markets correspond
to that description. We note that, even in environments where producers
are straightforwardly identiﬁable, such as the markets for wines or spirits,
where labelling or branding are common, high-quality producers very often
express their fear that the market be ﬂooded by low-quality variants tak-
ing advantage of the good "reputation" of the product and depressing its
price. For example, it is arguably hard to confuse a bottle of Champagne
from a grande maison with a bottle of sparkling wine produced in any other
region by an unknown wine-grower. Yet, Champagne producers have al-
ways protested against the use of this name outside the historical region of
production. This might well be an anti-competitive strategy but it is also
likely that, because the purchase of sparkling wine is not repeated enough
(or information acquisition, or processing, costs are high, or consumers have
cognitive limitations), purchasers tend to bunch these distinguishable prod-
ucts into the same category. Indeed, concerns of this kind have led members
of the World Trade Organization to grant a so-called higher level of protec-
tion to the place names used to identify the origin and quality, reputation
or other characteristics of wines and spirits. Thus, we believe that there are
many markets on which products are not absolutely undistinguishable but
t h ea s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o np r o b l e mw et a c k l eh e r ei sp r e s e n t ,t os o m ee x -
tent, with the same qualitative consequences. Similarly, outside the realm of
centralized markets, ﬁrms very likely have some pricing power. We take the
quantity competition assumption to stand for a form of moderate competi-
tion where the law of one price does hold but ﬁr m sc a n n o tc o m m i tt os e r v e
any level of demand addressed to them, as opposed to the case of Bertrand
competition.
There is of course a voluminous literature on Cournot competition, thor-
oughly surveyed, most recently, by Vives (1999). Our model is not the ﬁrst
not to guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium under
quantity competition. Early examples were provided (in a more general con-
text) by Roberts and Sonnenschein (1976). Even in the homogenous product
case, some well-accepted demand or cost structures can lead to the non-
quasiconcavity of ﬁrms’ payoﬀs. In our model, the linear presence of the
quality average term in the inverse demand function is suﬃcient to generate
some non-convexity of proﬁts. (We argue that this problem is not due to our
functional form but is instead a general feature of the economic situation of
interest.) The study of Cournot competition with diﬀerentiated products was
marked by the seminal contributions of Singh and Vives (1984) and Vives
4(1985) but to our knowledge, our analysis is the ﬁrst to incorporate an ele-
ment of asymmetric information between ﬁrms and consumers, in the spirit
of Akerlov (1970)’s market for lemons.
We introduce the formal model in Section 2. Section 3 brieﬂy recalls
the standard Cournot model, which corresponds to the special case when
qualities are identical. Section 4 deals with the general features of the case
when qualities are dissimilar. Section 5 attemps at classifying the equilibrium
outcomes on the basis of cost and quality heterogeneity. Section 6 develops
some welfare considerations. Section 7 concludes.
2M o d e l
We ﬁrst describe the model in its general form. After showing the unavoidable
diﬃculties it leads to, we describe the special case on which we will focus.
Two ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ {L,H} produce two variants of the same good,
whose qualities are denoted xL and xH, respectively. We assume that 0 <
xL ≤ xH. It is thus understood that our choice of subscript corresponds to
the quality ranking of the variants. The cost of production depends upon
quantity and quality and is given by a function µ : R+ ×R+ → R+. Because
the ﬁrms’ qualities are exogenously ﬁxed, we will slightly abuse notation by
indexing µ with i.T h a ti s ,µi(qi) ≡ µ(qi,x i).
Firms face a market (inverse) demand that is given by
P = P (Q, ¯ x),( 1 )
a function that strictly increases with ¯ x, the average quality of the units
brought to the market, and decreases with Q, the total quantity produced by
t h ed u o po l i s t s .W em a k et h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tf o ra n yq u a d r u p l e(xL,x H,q L,q H),
consumers infer or observe the "true" average quality ¯ x. This is so even when
ﬁrms consider "deviations" from the prescribed equilibrium behavior.1
1One could be precise about the time and information structure of the interaction, seen
as an extensive-form game. Because consumers cannot observe the variants’ quality, their
demand obviously depends upon their beliefs regarding this quality. Our assumption here
is that in all circumstances, on and oﬀ the equilibrium path, consumers’ (uniform) belief
corresponds to the correct average. In eﬀect, we prevent ﬁrms from taking advantage of
some inertia in the prevailing beliefs: although not directly observable, no "deviation"
can take place at unchanged beliefs. This is likely if production takes time and output
decisions have to be made well ahead of sales, which prevents "instantaneous deviations".
5To avoid trivialities, we assume that
P(0,x L) >c L and P(0,x H) >c H.
These inequalities reﬂect the idea that, should one only of these goods be
sold on the market, it could be proﬁtably supplied.2 We will refer to this
assumption as the proﬁtable supply assumption.
Firms compete àl aC o u r n o t , simultaneously deciding about the quantity
qi ≥ 0 they will bring to the market and then letting a ﬁctitious auctioneer
set the price that equates market demand with market supply. Yet they
are not price-takers: at the time they decide about their volume of produc-
tion, they recognize that a change in qi will aﬀect the market price. We
attempt at characterizing the (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria of this two-
player, simultaneous-move game.







− µi (qi).( 2 )
Using standard calculus notation, we have that
∂πi
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qLqH (xi − x−i)
(qL + qH)
2 .( 5 )
These expressions make clear that the presence of the average-quality term
considerably complicates the duopoly problem.
2These inequalities guarantee that the most enthusiastic consumer’s willingness to pay
will cover the cost of the "ﬁrst" unit.
6Assume for instance that the inverse demand curve intersects both axes















qL (xH − xL)
(qL + qH)
2 ,( 6 )
which is positive for suﬃciently low qL.T h a tm e a n st h a tﬁrm H’s program is
not always quasi-concave. Hence, the best-response correspondence may fail
to be a continuous function and we cannot appeal to the usual ﬁxed-point
theorems to prove the existence of (at least) one pure-strategy equilibrium.
The reason for the convexity of the proﬁt function in this quantity range will
soon become very clear.
Besides, observe that, since the very meaning of quality justiﬁes ∂P/∂¯ x>
0, it follows that whatever the assumption one is willing to make about the
relationship between the marginal willingness to pay for quality and quan-
tity (i.e. about the sign of ∂2P/∂q−i∂¯ x), terms in (xi − x−i) and (x−i − xi)
both appear in one of the two cross-derivatives. That implies that the best-
response of one of the two ﬁrms might well be non-monotonic, in which case
we cannot appeal to the standard existence theorems based on super-, or
sub-modularity. Again, the reason for this non-monotonicity will become
clear in the special case to which we will restrict our attention.
These issues arise independently on the assumptions made about the
curvature of the inverse demand curve or the cost function, as is usually the
case in oligopoly theory. Instead, they are rooted in the economics of the
problem at hand.
We therefore choose to concentrate on a special case. We take the simplest
one, in which the inverse demand curve is linear in both arguments. Thus,
the inverse demand curve is given by:
P = a +¯ x − bQ (7)
where a is a positive demand-shifting parameter and b, a strictly positive
demand-rotating parameter.
We also assume that the marginal cost of production only depends upon
quality. That is, technology exhibits constant returns to scale and ﬁrms
produce at unit costs cL and cH, respectively.
73 Standard Cournot duopoly
Setting xL = xH = x gives the usual Cournot duopoly model as a special
case. Indeed, both ﬁr m sf a c ead e m a n do ft h ef o r m
P = a + x − bQ.( 8 )
Still, they can have diﬀerent unit costs. In order to avoid any confusion, we
choose the ﬁrm indices so that cL <c H.
Firm i’s proﬁti sg i v e nb y
πi = qi [a + x − b(qi + q−i) − ci],( 9 )
where q−i stands for the quantity produced by ﬁrm i’s rival. For any q−i,t h e
proﬁt function, being quadratic and strictly concave in qi, admits a unique
maximizer on R+, which, if interior, is characterized by the ﬁrst-order con-
dition:
a + x − 2bqi − bq−i − ci =0 (10)
Disallowing negative quantities, one gets the best-response functions:
qi =m a x
½
0,
a + x − bq−i − ci
2b
¾
;i ∈ {L,H} (11)
Because dqi/dq−i < 0 at the interior solution, the two choice variables are
seen to be strategic substitutes.


















a + x + cL + cH
3
The producer facing the highest production cost ends up producing less
than its more eﬃcient competitor in equilibrium.
8One has to check that the values of q∗
L and q∗
H indeed lead both ﬁrms to
remain active on the market, a situation to which we will refer as a duopolistic
equilibrium.I t i s e a s i l y v e r i ﬁed that if cH − cL ≥ a + x − cH,t h e nﬁrm H
wants to withdraw from the market, for its margin turns negative.
There could then be an equilibrium in which the low-cost ﬁrm serves
the market and the high-cost producer decides to withdraw. We call such a
situation, in which only one ﬁrm remains active in equilibrium, a monopolistic
equilibrium. At this equilibrium, ﬁrm L produces the monopoly quantity, qM
L ,
and ﬁrm H’s margin is negative at all quantity levels. From the best-response




L ≥ a + x − cH,( 1 2 )
which is veriﬁed if and only if
cH − cL ≥ a + x − cH.( 1 3 )
S oi ft h ec o s td i ﬀerential is large enough in comparison to ﬁrm H’s margin
on the ﬁrst unit sold, then a monopolistic equilibrium exists and is unique.
Conversely, if the cost diﬀerential is low enough, then the duopolistic equi-
librium is the only equilibrium. If ﬁrms have the same cost function, then
the duopolistic equilibrium is unique and symmetric.
In view of the subsequent analysis, we ﬁnd it convenient to express these
results by reference to a (symmetric) cost heterogeneity parameter, δ.S of o r
any ﬁxed cL and cH,l e tc be their arithmetic average and set δ =( cH−cL)/2.
Then, cL = c − δ and cH = c + δ. We thus summarize this section with the
following claim.
Claim 1 In the case when the two ﬁrms produce a homogenous product
(xL = xH = x), the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium. Given a linear
inverse demand curve and a cost average, c, the nature of the equilibrium
depends upon the level of cost heterogeneity. (i) If δ ≥ (a + x − c)/3,t h e n
ﬁrm L produces qM
L =( a + x − c + δ)/(2b) and ﬁrm H withdraws from the


















a + x +2 c
3
.
Observe that, at unchanged average, a small increase in the cost diﬀer-
ential does not impact the aggregate variables. It only distorts the market
shares in favor of the eﬃcient ﬁrm.
4 Unobservable diﬀerences in quality
Suppose now that the two ﬁr m sd on ol o n g e rp r o d u c eah o m o g e n o u sp r o d u c t ,
and xL <x H.






− b(qL + qH) − ci
¸
.( 1 4 )
It is a matter of computation to derive the following expressions, which
we display here for reference:
∂πi
∂qi
= a +¯ x − bQ − ci − bqi +
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10Firms will now recognize that they can aﬀect the market price in two
distinct manners: by producing more, they depress the willingness to pay of
the marginal consumer along the current demand curve, but by doing so they
also change the average quality, which shifts the demand curve altogether.
This additional eﬀect is captured by the last term in equation (15), which
did not appear in the standard Cournot model.
We ﬁrst attempt at giving a general description of the nature of the
problem that ﬁrms face and its consequence on the existence and features
of equilibria. In the next section, we try to make these results precise for
various combinations of cost and quality heterogeneity levels.
4.1 Existence of interior solutions to the ﬁrms’ prob-
lems
Observe that πL(0,q H)=πH(qL,0) = 0 and lim
qi→+∞πi = −∞.W i t hxL <x H,
πL is strictly concave in qL for any qH ≥ 0.S i n c eπL is then single-peaked on
R+, ﬁrm L’s output decision is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition if
and only if, given ﬁrm H’s quality and quantity, ﬁrm L’s margin on the "ﬁrst"
unit sold is positive (which amounts to saying that ∂πL(0,q H)/∂qL ≥ 0). In
turn, this condition is met when ﬁrm H does not depress the price too much
by "ﬂooding the market".
Remark 2 T h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt oﬁrm L’s problem is characterized by the
ﬁrst-order condition if and only if
bqH ≤ a + xH − cL. (18)
Denote ρH the supremum of the quantities qH that elicit a strictly positive
response from ﬁrm L.
By contrast, πH may not be strictly concave in qH everywhere (although
it eventually turns so). In particular, there can be a convex section for low
values of qH if the quality diﬀerential is big relatively to the demand curve
slope. So, either πH, being continuous and eventually negative, achieves an
interior global maximum for a ﬁnite qH > 0, or there is a corner solution at
qH =0 , or both. The usual ﬁrst-order condition is necessary in the ﬁrst case
but in general not suﬃcient. It takes a little work to establish the precise
conditions under which ﬁrm H chooses to remain active on the market.
11Proposition 3 If it is the case that
bqL < max
(
a + xL − cH,min
(
xH − xL,





then ﬁrm H’s program admits a unique solution, and this solution satisﬁes
the ﬁrst-order condition. If xH −xL >a+xL−cH, then for qL =
(a+xH−cH)2
4b(xH−xL) ,
ﬁrm H’s program admits two solutions, one interior solution satisfying the
ﬁrst-order condition and one corner solution. In all other cases, the unique
solution to ﬁrm H’s problem is qH =0 .
Proof. The question of whether πH(qL,q H) a s s u m e ss o m ep o s i t i v ev a l u e so n




− b(qL + qH) − cH,( 2 0 )
aw e l l - d e ﬁned rational function of qH on R+,f o ra n yqL > 0.
If µH takes positive values on (0,+∞), then there is an interior solution
to the ﬁrm’s problem as ﬁrm H can make a positive proﬁti nt h a tr a n g e .






2 − b,( 2 1 )
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− b,( 2 3 )
and
µH(qL,0) = a + xL − bqL − cH (24)
(i) If µH(qL,0) is strictly greater then zero (i.e. if bqL <a+ xL − cH),
then by continuity πH must achieve a positive interior maximum. There is a
unique interior solution to ﬁrm H’s problem.
(ii) If bqL ≥ a + xL − cH, then one must distinguish two cases.
(a) If
∂µH(qL,0)
∂qH ≤ 0 (i.e. if bqL ≥ xH − xL), then µH assumes strictly




∂qH > 0 (i.e. if bqL <x H −xL), then it is possible that µH
increases suﬃciently to reach the positive range before starting decreasing
inexorably. In any case, from the ﬁrst-order condition, the maximum is
reached at qH =
q
qL(xH−xL)
b − qL, leading to an average quality equal to
xH −
p
bqL(xH − xL), and a margin equal to a+xH −cH −2
p
bqL(xH − xL).
Thus, there is an interior solution if and only if this latter expression is
positive, that is, if and only if bqL ≤
(a+xH−cH)2
4(xH−xL) .
Note that when xH −xL ≤ (a + xH − cH)/2 ≤ a+xL −cH, the previous
inequality is mechanically satisﬁed once bqL <x H −xL. So the only instance
in which the condition can strictly bind is when xH−xL > (a + xH − cH)/2 >
a + xL − cH.
In that case, when bqL exactly equals
(a+xH−cH)2
4(xH−xL) , the best interior margin
equals zero. The quantity qH associated with this margin is given by








and must correspond to a local maximum of the proﬁt function, reaching
zero at that point, negative everywhere else on (0,+∞). Observe that this
quantity is strictly positive since xH−xL >a+xL−cH.T h u s ,ﬁrm H’s best-
response correspondence at this point is pair-valued: the optimal response
comprises the interior solution as well as the corner solution. So bqL must be
strictly smaller than (a + xH − cH)
2 /[4(xH −xL)] in order for the ﬁrst-order
condition necessarily to be veriﬁed at a solution to the ﬁrm’s problem.
Denote ρL the supremum of the set of quantities qL that elicit a strictly
positive response from ﬁrm H.
4.1.1 Numerical examples
We illustrate the conditions above by looking at some numerical examples.
Let xL =1 , xH =2 , cL =1 , cH =3 , a =5 ,a n db =1 .W ec a nc o m p u t e
the value of the tresholds:
a + xL − cH =3
xH − xL =1














Figure 1: Strict concavity of ﬁrm H’s problem
On ﬁg u r e1 ,t h et h i nl i n ei sf o rqL =2 . The thick line is for qL =4 .T h e
general shapes of these two curves are the only possible here as the quality
diﬀerential is too small to generate some convex sections.
Contrast with the following example, depicted on ﬁgure 2: xL =1 , xH =
10, cL =0 , cH =1 , a =5 ,a n db =1 ,g i v i n g
a + xL − cH =5
xH − xL =9




T h et h i nl i n ei sf o rqL =4 .8, the thicker line for qL =5 .35,a n dt h e
thickest line for qL =5 .5. One can observe the convex sections of the curve
that the relatively large quality diﬀerential creates near zero. A curve for











Figure 2: An example of the possible non-concavity of ﬁrm H’s problem
qL > 9,n o ts h o w no nt h eﬁgure, would be downward-sloping and concave
everywhere on [0,+∞).
We now attempt at describing the incentives that ﬁrms face and the
general shape of the the best-response curves to which these incentives give
rise.
4.2 Firms’ best responses
Consider the ﬁrst-order conditions necessarily satisﬁed at the interior solu-




− b(qL + qH) − cL +
qLqH (xL − xH)
(qL + qH)




− b(qL + qH) − cH +
qLqH (xH − xL)
(qL + qH)
2 − bqH =0 .( B )
4.2.1 Incentives to produce
It is possible to rewrite conditions (A) and (B) in a more illustrative manner.
After some manipulation (A) gives












xH = cL.( 2 6 )
This expression shows that the ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm L is the same as
the one in the standard Cournot model, except that the demand-intercept
term not only depends upon the quantities chosen by the players but, for
those quantities, is also a downward-distorted linear combination of xL and
xH. Therefore, the fact that consumers immediately observe the average
quality available on the market decreases ﬁrm L’s marginal revenue, as any
additional output brought to the market not only depresses the market price
along the current demand curve but also impacts this average, thus shifting
the demand curve down.
Similarly, one can rewrite (B) as












xH = cH.( 2 7 )
This expression shows that for the high-quality ﬁrm, the weights on the qual-
ities distort the average upwards. Therefore, for given quantity levels, ﬁrm
H’s marginal revenue from increasing output is higher than in the standard
Cournot model, as this increase has the additional eﬀect of increasing the
average quality.
4.2.2 Strategic relationship between the ﬁrms’ actions
One can also rewrite (A) as:





(xL − xH).( 2 8 )
16For a given value of qH, the left-hand side (LHS) is a linear function of qL with
n e g a t i v es l o p e .T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d e( R H S )a s s u m e so n l yn e g a t i v ev a l u e sa n d
monotonically increases towards 0. These geometrical considerations conﬁrm
what was infered from the strict concavity of the high-cost ﬁrm’s problem,
i.e. that its best response is unique, and interior as long as bqH ≤ a+xH−cL.
It is clearly continuous in qH. A change in qH shifts the straight line down
but also pushes the hyperbola down (in the bottom-right quadrant) so that
the total eﬀect is a priori undeterminate.
An application of the implicit-function theorem in the neighborhood of





(qL+qH)3 (xH − xL) − 1
2b
(qH)2
(qL+qH)3 (xH − xL)+b
(29)
So, if b is small, and the quality diﬀerential is large, an increase in qH can
drive the average quality suﬃciently high for ﬁrm L to ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
increase its own quantity. Figure 3 illustrates this possibility. It depicts ﬁrm
L’s best response (measured along the horizontal axis) as a function of qH
for the case when a =9 , b =1 , xL =2 , xH =1 0 0 ,a n dcL =1 .
This graph hides the fact that ﬁrm L’s best response is initially decreasing
in qH (at the rate of 1/2, like in the standard Cournot model). Figure 4 is a






T h u s ,i ti sn o ta l w a y st h ec a s et h a tt h et w op r o d u c e r s ’q u a n t i t i e sa r e







3 (xH − xL) −
1
2
b ≥ 0.( 3 0 )
The ﬁrst term in the right-most inequality is the product of ﬁrm H’s market
share, denoted z,w i t ht h ee ﬀect of a change in qH on the average quality
∂¯ x/∂qH, itself equal to (1 − z) 1
Q (xH − xL). From this observation stream
several features of ﬁrm L’s best response. First, BRL cannot be upward-
sloping at points that are too close to the axes or too distant from the origin.










,( 3 1 )










Figure 3: Firm L’s best response when the quality diﬀerential is big
which is greater than −1/2 in all events. So because BRL is moving away
from the main diagonal and from the origin at this point, dqL/dqH must be
decreasing in this neighborhood, implying that BRL is concave. Once the
main diagonal is crossed, because the curve moves away and qH increases, the
s l o p ei n( 2 9 )m u s tc o n v e r g et o−1/2 from above, ruling out any inﬂexion and
upward-sloping portion. So, if an upward-sloping portion exists, the inﬂexion
must take place before the curve crosses the 45-degree line.
Similarly, one can rewrite (B) as





(xH − xL) (32)
This time, for a given value of qL, the LHS is a linear function of qH with
negative slope while the RHS is a downward-sloping hyperbola assuming only









Figure 4: Firm L’s best response when the quality diﬀerential is big (zoom)
positive values. Right of −qL,i ti st h u sp o s s i b l ef o rt h ec u r v e st oi n t e r s e c t
once, twice, or not at all. The circumstances in which they intersect only once
in the positive orthant are of course the same as the ones ensuring the global
concavity of πH on R+. The circumstances in which they don’t intersect at
a l li nt h ep o s i t i v eo r t h a n ta r et h er e v e r s eo ft h eo n e se n s u r i n gt h a tt h e r ei s
an interior best-response. Observe that i nt h ec a s ew h e r et h ec u r v e si n t e r s e c t
twice, there is no need for formally checking the second-order condition as
the higher quantity always corresponds to the local maximum of the proﬁt
function on (0,+∞). Observe also that when qL goes up, the line shifts down
while the hyperbola shifts up. As a result, the qH-coordinate of the left-most
intersection goes up while the qH-coordinate of the right-most intersection
goes down.
Thus, ﬁrm H’s unique interior best-response is locally strictly decreasing
19in qL and concave. Unfortunately, ﬁrm H’s best-response correspondence
is not a continuous function on R+. Indeed, recall that, when the quality
diﬀerential is large (xH − xL >a+ xL − cH), ﬁrm H is indiﬀerent between








> 0 for qL =
(a+xH−cH)2
4b(xH−xL) .T h u s ,
at this point, the best-response correspondence is not singleton-valued. It
is upper-hemicontinuous, though, and each "branch" of the correspondence
graph is nonincreasing in qL.
We summarize these results in the following claim.4
Claim 4 Firm L’s best response BRL(qH) is a continuous, possibly non-
monotonic function of qH, although it is strictly decreasing in the neigh-
borhood of 0 and ρH.F i r m H’s best-response correspondence, BRH(qL),i s
singleton-valued at all points, with the possible exception of the point qL =
(a+xH−cH)2
4b(xH−xL) in the event where xH−xL >a+xL−cH (in which case the ﬁrm’s
problem admits both an interior and a corner solution). BRH is nevertheless
upper-hemicontinuous and non-increasing in qL.O n [0,ρ L),i ti sas t r i c t l y
decreasing and concave function.
Again, because of these features of ﬁrms’ best-responses, one cannot use
the tools commonly applied in oligopoly theory to show the general existence,
unicity, or stability of Nash equilibria. In particular, owing to the "discon-
tinuity" in BRH, one can not resort to traditional ﬁxed-point theorems to
prove existence. Similarly, owing to the non-monotonicity of BRL one can-
not redeﬁne strategic variables in a way that transforms the model into a
supermodular game, as in the standard Cournot duopoly.
4.3 Monopolistic equilibria
The conditions for the existence of interior best-responses derived in the
previous section allow us to study the existence of monopolistic equilibria in
which one ﬁrm produces a strictly positive quantity (in fact, the monopoly
output) and the other one withdraws from the market. There are two possible
classes of monopolistic equilibria: one in which ﬁrm L is inactive and one in
which ﬁrm H is inactive.
4In all rigor, by "non-increasing" we mean that if g ∈ BRH(qL) and h ∈ BRH(q0
L)
for any pair (qL,q0
L) such that 0 ≤ qL <q 0
L,t h e ng ≥ h. Because this last inequality is
true for any two selections from the correspondence at the two points, this property is
sometimes referred to as "strong monotonicity".
204.3.1 Inactive low-quality ﬁrm
Take for our candidate equilibrium the situation in which the high-quality
ﬁrm produces qH > 0 and the low-quality ﬁrm shuts down: qL =0 .F o rt h i s
l a t t e rb e h a v i o rt ob eo p t i m a lo n en e e d s :
qH ≥
a + xH − cL
b
.( 3 3 )
The question is: Does ﬁrm H ﬁnd it optimal to provide so large a quantity
under the assumption that ﬁrm L leaves the market? In equilibrium, ﬁrm H
should take ﬁrm L’s withdrawal for granted and best-respond by producing




a + xH − cH
2b
.( 3 4 )
This volume is greater than the treshold iﬀ
a + xH − cH
2b
≥
a + xH − cL
b
,( 3 5 )
or, equivalently
cL − cH ≥ a + xH − cL.( 3 6 )
Under our proﬁtable supply assumption, this inequality is impossible to
satisfy for cH ≥ cL but if marginal cost decreases suﬃciently with quality,
then there exits a monopolistic equilibrium in which ﬁrm L is inactive. The
condition resembles the one in the standard Cournot model, in that the cost
diﬀerential must be suﬃciently unfavorable to ﬁrm L as to turn negative its
margin on the ﬁrst unit sold.
4.3.2 Inactive high-quality ﬁrm




2b and the ﬁrm H shuts down: qH =0 . For this latter













.( 3 7 )
It is immediately observed that
a+xH−cH
2 is the arithmetic average of a+
xL − cH and xH − xL. So we need to distinguish only two cases, according
to the ranking of these two magnitudes.
21Large quality diﬀerential Suppose that the quality diﬀerential is rela-
tively big, so that
xH − xL ≥
a + xH − cH
2














The relevant quantity treshold for qL is then either (a + xL − cH)/b or
(a+xH−cH)2
4b(xH−xL) .N o t et h a tf o rxH >x L:
a+xL−cH ≤
(a + xH − cH)
2
4(xH − xL)
⇐⇒ (a + xL − cH)(xH − xL) ≤
µ





If a + xL − cH < 0, then this proposition is always true, since xH >x L by
assumption. Else,
a+xL−cH ≤





(a + xL − cH)(xH − xL) ≤




As the geometric mean of two positive numbers is no greater than their
arithmetic mean, we have
p
(a + xL − cH)(xH − xL) ≤
a + xH − cH
2
.( 4 2 )
H e n c ei ti sa l w a y st r u et h a t
a + xL − cH ≤




As a result, the relevant treshold when the quality diﬀerential is high is
always
(a+xH−cH)2
4b(xH−xL) . In a sense, all that matters for ﬁrm H is whether, in
the event that the margin on the ﬁr s tu n i ts o l di sn e g a t i v e( o w i n gt oﬁrm
L’s large production), it can restaure its proﬁtability by driving the average








a + xL − cL
2
¶
(xH − xL) ≥
µ





22w h i c hi st r u ew h e n e v e ra+xL−cL is not much smaller than a+xH−cH.T h e
exact treshold depends on the diﬀerence between (xH −xL) and
a+xH−cH
2 .A
suﬃcient condition for the inequality to hold is cH − cL ≥ xH − xL (but if
ab i gd i ﬀerence between a + xL − cH and xH − xL exists, then ﬁrm L needs
less of a cost advantage).
Small quality diﬀerential Suppose that
xH − xL <
a + xH − cH
2
<a+ xL − cH.( 4 5 )
Then the relevant treshold is (a + xL − cH)/b. This occurs whenever the
demand for ﬁrm L’s product is relatively high in comparison to the quality
diﬀerential. Then, all that matters for ﬁrm H is whether the margin on the
ﬁr s tu n i ts o l di sp o s i t i v eo rn o tb e c a u s ew h e n e v e ri ti sp o s s i b l et oe n j o ya
positive margin by driving quality up through mass production, it is also the





a + xL − cH
b
⇐⇒
a + xL − cL
2
≥ a+xL−cH ⇐⇒ cH−cL ≥ a+xL−cH.
(46)
T h a ti s ,o n c ea g a i n ,t h ec o s td i ﬀerential must be large enough for a monop-
olistic equilibrium to exist. A necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for it
to hold is cH − cL ≥ xH − xL.
We summarize the observations made in that section by providing a suf-
ﬁcient condition for the existence of a monopolistic equilibrium. In the stan-
dard Cournot model, monopolistic equilibria were sustained by a cost diﬀer-
ential larger than the margin on the ﬁr s tu n i ts o l db yt h ee v i c t e dﬁrm. This
condition carries over but one also has to account for the fact that even if
this margin is negative, ﬁrm H can (sometimes) drive prices up by increas-
ing its quantity and thus average quality. In that instance, eviction is always
possible if the cost diﬀerential is larger than the quality diﬀerential.
Claim 5 If the cost diﬀerential is suﬃciently unfavorable to ﬁrm i,t h a ti s
if
ci − c−i ≥ max{a + x−i − ci ,x i − x−i}, (47)
then there always exists an equilibrium in which ﬁrm −i produces the monopoly
output qM
−i =( a + x−i − c−i)/(2b) and ﬁrm i withdraws from the market.
234.4 Duopolistic equilibria
Claim 13 above established that ﬁrm L’s best-response correspondence is
in fact a continuous function, although possibly non-monotone, while ﬁrm
H’s best-response correspondence is upper semi-continuous, and singleton-
valued at all points except, sometimes, at qL =
(a+xH−cH)2
4b(xH−xL) .I t r e m a i n s t o
be shown that there are circumstances in which the best-response curves
intersect away from the axes, thus proving the existence of a pure-strategy
duopolistic equilibrium. As it happens, there are instances in which such
an equilibrium fails to exist. We do not immediately tackle this question
but instead look at the multiplicity issue. In a fashion that parallels our
treatment of cost heterogeneity, we introduce x, taken to be the arithmetic
average of qualities xL and xH,a n dl e tε =( xH−xL)/2.T h i sw a y ,xL = x−ε
and xH = x+ε. We are now in the position to state our result on the number
of duopolistic equilibria.
Proposition 6 There exist at most two pure-strategy duopolistic equilibria.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a duopolistic equilibrium in pure-strategies.














.( 4 8 )
Observe that qL and qH are uniquely determined by z and the parameters
of the model.
By substitution of qL and qH,a sg i v e nb yt h eﬁrst two equations, into
the third one, and by deﬁnition of x, ε, c,a n dδ, one obtains the following
equation in z:
z =
a + x +( 2 z − 1)ε − c +3[ 2 εz(1 − z) − δ]
2[a + x +( 2 z − 1)ε − c]
.( 4 9 )
In a duopolistic equilibrium, Q = qL + qH > 0. So one can multiply both
sides of equation (49) by its denominator to obtain a quadratic equation inz.
Its discriminant equals 15ε2+M2−30δε. If it is negative, then there cannot
24exist a solution to the system of equations (A) and (B), which contradicts







15ε(ε − 2δ)+M2 − M
10ε







15ε(ε − 2δ)+M2 + M
10ε
.( 5 1 )
Each root need not correspond to an equilibrium but the associated quanti-
ties are the only candidate equilibria. Therefore, there can be at most two
duopolistic equilibria.
As a by-product, the proposition singles out the candidate equilibria.








































.( 5 3 )
Plugging this quantity into the inverse demand curve gives
P







.( 5 4 )








































.( 5 6 )
25Plugging this quantity into the inverse demand curve gives
P







.( 5 7 )
Several remarks are in order. First, in constrast with the standard Cournot
duopoly, the market outcomes are not independent on the level of cost het-
erogeneity: the (candidate) equilibrium prices and quantities are functions
of δ, and a change in ﬁrms’ cost parameters (keeping the average constant)
does more than shifting production and proﬁtf r o mo n eﬁrm to the other.
Second, from the proof of Proposition 15, it is readily observed that z∗∗ <
1/2 for any choice of parameters (as long as M>0), and that z∗ > 1/2 if
and only if ε>2δ. So we have the following corollary.
Corollary 7 There can exist a pure-strategy duopolistic equilibrium in which
ﬁrm H produces a higher quantity than ﬁrm L (q∗
H >q ∗
L)o n l yi f2(cH − cL) <
xH − xL, or, equivalently, 2δ<ε .






The condition requires the marginal cost of production not to increase too
quickly with quality.
Third, in those cases where ﬁrm H’s problem is not concave, the pair
(q∗∗
L ,q∗∗
H) (assuming it involve positive quantities) may not be an equilibrium,
as q∗∗
H can then correspond to a local minimum or a non-global maximum of
ﬁrm H’s proﬁt function. In the ﬁrst case, (q∗∗
L ,q ∗∗
H) lies on the lower branch
of the locus of points satisfying ﬁrm H’s ﬁrst-order condition. In the second
case, it lies on its upper branch but not on ﬁrm H’s best-global-response
curve, BRH, because the corner solution is preferred.
Now, we have already argued that BRH, in the range of quantities that
elicit a strictly positive response from ﬁrm H (i.e. for 0 ≤ qL <ρ L)i sa
continuous and strictly decreasing function. From the expressions for the
candidate equilibrium quantities, it is easy to see that q∗∗
H <q ∗
H.T h u s , i f
(q∗∗
L ,q∗∗
H) lies on BRH,t h e n(q∗
L,q ∗
H) lies on it as well.
Corollary 8 If (q∗∗
L ,q ∗∗
H) ∈ R2
++ is an equilibrium, then (q∗
L,q ∗
H) is an equi-




26In particular, whenever ε>2δ, if there exists a duopolistic equilibrium
in which q∗∗
L >q ∗∗





H,p r o v i d e dq∗
L > 0.
The previous corollary bears on the issue of equilibrium selection. Indeed,
recall that ﬁrm H’s best-interior-response is a strictly increasing and concave
function of qL on [0,ρ L).S o ,i f(q∗∗
L ,q∗∗
H) lies on the upper "branch" of BRH
and therefore is an equilibrium, then it must be the case that BRL is ﬂatter
than BRH there (in the qL×qH space). That implies that (q∗∗
L ,q∗∗
H) is always
an unstable equilibrium under the usual (i.e. alternate) best-reply dynamics.
For the reverse reason, (q∗
L,q∗
H) is always stable.
Corollary 9 If an equilibrium, (q∗
L,q∗
H) is always stable under the usual best-
reply dynamics. If an equilibrium, (q∗∗
L ,q∗∗
H) is always unstable.
In our detailed treatment below, we will thus focus on the monopolistic
equilibria on one hand, and on (q∗
L,q ∗
H) on the other hand.
5 A taxonomy of equilibria
We now want to describe the possible equilibrium outcomes in relation to
the levels of cost heterogeneity and quality heterogeneity. The case where
ε =0corresponds to the standard Cournot model and was covered in Section
3. We take in turn the cases where the cost function µ does not depend on
quality, decreases with quality, and increases with it.
5.1 Identical marginal costs
Suppose that cH = cL = c,o rδ =0 .
There does not exist any monopolistic equilibrium in this situation as a
ﬁrm cannot deter its rival from entering the market, which always requires
a cost advantage. This is just another way of saying that ρL >q M
L and
ρH >q M
H for all values of ε. So we focus on duopolistic equilibria. We
claim that, independently on the level of quality heterogeneity, a unique,
pure-strategy duopolistic equilibrium always exists when costs are identical.
Proposition 10 For δ =0and for any ε, there exists a unique stable, pure-
strategy equilibrium, which is duopolistic and characterized by the following







15ε2 +( a + x − c)2 − (a + x − c)
10ε
, (59)















15ε2 +( a + x − c)2 +4 ( a + x − c)
5
. (61)
Proof. From Section 3.4.3, we know there cannot exist any monopolistic
equilibrium with δ =0 .








15ε2 + M2 − M
10ε
,( 6 2 )















































15ε2 + M2 +4 M
5
,( 6 3 )
and
P




15ε2 + M2 +4 M
5
.( 6 4 )
The point (q∗
L,q∗
H) will not correspond to an equilibrium in the circum-
stances where either (i) it lies outside the positive orthant, or (ii) the ﬁrst-
order conditions do not characterize the ﬁrm’s best global responses.






5 > 0.T h e r e f o r e ,i f(q∗
L,q ∗
H) lies outside





1−z∗ ≤ 0, which occurs only if z∗ ≤ 1
2.T h i s
cannot happen since z∗ > 1
2 for any ε>0.
A sf o r( i i ) ,t h e r ei sn oi s s u ei ft h eq u a l i t yd i ﬀerential is small, for then BRH
is a continuous function which coincides with the locus of points satisfying
the ﬁrst-order condition for all qL ∈ [0,ρ L]. If the quality diﬀerential is large
(i.e. if a+xL−cH ≤ xH−xL, or, equivalently, ε>M / 3), then BRH exhibits





4ε ,a tw h i c hp o i n tb o t hqH =0






are optimal responses. A simple computation







.( 6 5 )
If we can show that z∗ ≥ ˜ z for any choice of parameters, then we will be
done as we will be reassured that the intersection of ﬁrm L’s best interior
response curve with ﬁrm H’s best interior response curve lies to the left of
the possible "jump" in ﬁrm H’s best global response. Now,
z
∗ − ˜ z =




,( 6 6 )
which a simple computation shows is positive for any M and ε.
Several remarks are in order before we proceed with illustrations. First, by
L’Hospital rule, q∗
L and q∗
H tend to (a+x−c)/3b as ε tends to 0. In that sense,
the standard Cournot result with identical marginal costs is robust to the
homogeneity assumption, as the introduction of a small quality diﬀerential
leads to an equilibrium that is "close" to the usual Cournot outcome.
Second, z∗ monotonically increases toward 1/2+
√
15/10 ' 0.89 as ε
increases. So, ﬁrm H’s market share always goes up as this ﬁrm’s quality
advantage increases. Nonetheless, even in the case of an extreme advantage,
ﬁrm L’s always secures at least 10% of the sales. It is never possible for the
quality leader to reduce its competitor to insigniﬁc a n c eo nt h i sm a r k e t .
Third, this pattern can be explained by the rates of change in the ﬁrms’
equilibrium quantities. q∗
H is an increasing function of ε for any M and b.
Asymptotically, it increases linearly, which implies that it grows with ε at
a smaller and smaller rate. q∗
L ﬁrst decreases then increases with ε.I n t h e










Figure 5: Equilibrium quantities for M =1 0and b =1
limit, it also tends to increase linearly. The convergence of z∗ implies that
the growth rates of both equilibrium quantities must themselves converge.
Figure 5 displays the equilibrium quantities as functions of ε in the case
when M =1 0and b =1 . The solid line is ﬁrm L’s quantity. The dotted line
is ﬁrm H’s quantity.
The same data, plotted against a logarithmic scale on ﬁgure 6, makes
clear that after an initial divergence phase, the two quantities grow at the
same rate.
We now illustrate the equilibrium itself with two examples, typical of the
two possible conﬁgurations that arise when δ =0 .
F i g u r e7i sf o rt h ec a s ew h e na =1 0 , b =2 , xL =1 , xH =2 , cL = cH =1 .
That corresponds to x =1 .5, c =1 , δ =0 , ε = .5. The solid line is ﬁrm
L’s best response. The dotted line is ﬁrm H’s best response. The dashed











Figure 6: Equilibrium quantities for M =1 0and b =1- logarithmic scale
line is the main diagonal. The quality diﬀerential being small, both best
responses are continuous, decreasing functions of the other ﬁrm’s quantity,
as in the standard Cournot model. The intersection lies to the left of the
main diagonal, implying that ﬁrm H dominates the market.
Figure 8 is for the case when a =1 0 , b =2 , xL =1 , xH =1 0 1 , cL =
cH =1 . That corresponds to x =5 1 , c =1 , δ =0 , ε =5 0 . Because of the
large quality diﬀerential, BRL becomes non-monotone and BRH exhibits a
nonconvexity at 15.125. Nonetheless, the curves intersect only once, to the
left of the main diagonal and the "jump" in BRH.
5.2 Decreasing marginal cost
Consider the case now where c decreases with quality. This is not as implau-
sible a situation as it might seem. Quality could be associated with the use of










Figure 7: The unique equilibrium in the case of a small quality diﬀerential
(xL =1 ; xH =2 ) and no cost diﬀerential (cL = cH =1 )
technologies requiring big set-up or ﬁxed costs but commanding low marginal
costs. In fact, any quality-improving mechanization of the production process
would constitute an example of this phenomenon. The market for collected
blood is also often mentioned in that context, as donors tend to self-select
in such a way that the quality of the blood collected from volunteers is on
average higher than the quality of the blood collected from proﬁt-motivated
donors, which generates an inverse relationship between quality and variable
cost.
In any case, assume in that section that δ<0.
In this conﬁguration, there cannot exist a monopolistic equilibrium in
which only ﬁrm L is active as it is at a cost disadvantage. By contrast, from
Section 4.3 we know that ﬁrm H can remain the only active ﬁrm if and only










Figure 8: The unique equilibrium in the case of a large quality diﬀerential
(xL =1 ; xH =1 0 1 ) and no cost diﬀerential (cL = cH =1 )




.( 6 7 )
For a given M, the right-hand side is a linear function of ε. The higher
the quality diﬀerential, the bigger ﬁrm H’ sc o s ta d v a n t a g em u s tb ei no r d e r
for it to monopolize the market. That is, a big quality advantage makes it
harder for the leading ﬁrm to evict its competitor. This is of course because
the latter can free-ride on consumers’ high valuation of the product and is
therefore led to increase its quantity. Therefore, ﬁrm H must be in the
position to dump a very big quantity on the market in order to preclude ﬁrm
L’s entry.
Two questions remain. When a monopolistic equilibrium exists, can it
33co-exist with a duopolistic equilibrium? When a monopolistic equilibrium
does not exist, does a duopolistic equilibrium always exist? The answers are
"no" and "yes", respectively.
Proposition 11 Suppose that δ<0.( i )I f−δ ≥ M+ε
3 ,t h e nt h e r ei sau n i q u e
stable, pure-strategy equilibrium, which is H-monopolistic. (ii) If −δ<M+ε
3 ,
then there is a unique stable pure-strategy equilibrium, which is duopolistic,







15ε(ε − 2δ)+( a + x − c)2 − (a + x − c)
10ε
, (68)















15ε(ε − 2δ)+( a + x − c)2 +4 ( a + x − c)
5
. (70)
Proof. From Section 3.4.4, there is only one stable, pure-strategy duopolistic
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H cannot be simultaneously negative, one only needs to





,w h i c hr e q u i r e s
0 ≤
√





.( 7 3 )
34The left-most inequality is trivially satisﬁed for ε>0 and δ<0.T h e
right-most inequality is satisﬁed if and only if −δ<M+ε
3 ,w h i c hi st h es a m e
condition as the one leading to the non-existence of a monopolistic equilib-
rium. Thus, a duopolistic equilibrium and a monopolistic equilibrium cannot
coexist.
It remains to show that a duopolistic equilibrium never fails to exist when
−δ<M+ε
3 . So suppose this inequality holds and distinguish the cases of a
small and large quality diﬀerential.
Take the case of a small quality diﬀerential ﬁrst. Suppose that
xH − xL <a+ xL − cH,( 7 4 )
or, equivalently,
−δ>3ε − M.( 7 5 )
Then, BRH is a non-increasing, continuous function of qL,a n dw eh a v e
qM
L <ρ L and qM
H <ρ H. As the two continuous best- response curves must
then intersect away from the axes, the pure-strategy duopolistic equilibrium
always exists.
Assume now that
−δ ≤ 3ε − M.( 7 6 )
Then BRH is no longer a continuous curve. Nevertheless, in the parameter
region where there is no monopolistic equilibrium, the interior best-response
curves intersect in the positive orthant and it only remains to be checked
that this intersection lies left of the "jump" in BRH.
Observe that the non-convexity in BRH occurs at ˜ qL =
(a+xH−cH)2
4b(xH−xL) ,a t
which point the best interior reply is ˜ qH =˜ qL(1 − ˜ qL).F i r m H’s market
s h a r ea tt h i sp o i n ti sg i v e nb y
˜ z =1−
M + ε − δ
4ε
.( 7 7 )
(q∗
L,q ∗
H)lies to the left of the non-convexity only if z∗ ≥ ˜ z.W eh a v e
z
∗ − ˜ z =




.( 7 8 )
As i m p l ec o m p u t a t i o ns h o w st h a tt h i sq u a n t i t yi sa l w a y sp o s i t i v e ,s ot h a t
this constraint never binds. Therefore, (q∗
L,q∗
H) never lies right of the "jump"
in BRH.
355.3 Increasing marginal cost
We now turn to the case when δ>0, i.e. when marginal cost increases with
quality.
5.3.1 Monopolistic equilibrium region
In this conﬁguration, ﬁrm H has a quality advantage over ﬁrm L but suﬀers
from a cost disadvantage. Hence, there cannot exist any H-monopolistic
equilibrium. An L-monopolistic equilibrium may exist, under conditions that
vary with the size of the quality diﬀerential. We accordingly distinguish cases.
Small quality diﬀerential Suppose that
xH − xL ≤ a + xL − cH,( 7 9 )
or, equivalently,
δ ≤ M − 3ε.( 8 0 )
In that case, there can exist a L-monopolistic equilibrium only if





.( 8 2 )
Observe that in that parameter range, a higher quality diﬀerential corre-
sponds to a lower cost diﬀerential treshold. This is caused by our symmetric
measure of quality heterogeneity. When ε increases, ﬁrm L’s quality dimin-
ishes, which decreases the willingness to pay on a market dominated by frm
L. That makes it "easier" for ﬁrm L to evict ﬁrm H (in equilibrium), in the
s e n s et h a ti tr e q u i r e sas m a l l e rc o s ta d v a n t a g e .
Large quality diﬀerential Suppose now that
xH − xL >a+ xL − cH,( 8 3 )
or, equivalently,
δ>M− 3ε.( 8 4 )
36In that case, there can exist a L-monopolistic equilibrium if and only if
µ
a + xL − cL
2
¶
(xH − xL) ≥
µ
a + xH − cH
2
¶2
,( 8 5 )
or, equivalently,
ε(M + δ − ε) ≥
(M − δ + ε)
2
4
.( 8 6 )
This inequation is quadratic in δ,a n di sa l w a y sv e r i ﬁed within a closed in-
terval lying in R+, whose bounds depend on M and ε. More precisely, it is
true whenever
M +3 ε − 2
√
ε2 +2 Mε≤ δ ≤ M +3 ε +2
√
ε2 +2 Mε.( 8 7 )
The right-most inequality is an algebraic artefact. It corresponds to a situa-
tion where the original inequality would be true only because ﬁrm H would
make enormous losses, which is ruled out. So, in eﬀect, the left-most inequal-
ity sets the lower bound on δ for ﬁrm L to enjoy monopoly in equilibrium.
Asymptotically, this bound approaches M + ε from below. One implication
is that, even when the quality diﬀerential is extremely large, there always
exist circumstances (i.e. combinations of δ and ε)i nw h i c hﬁrm H would
have proﬁtably sold its product on a separate market (although barely so)
but ends up being inactive in equilibrium when buyers do not distinguish its
product from ﬁrm L’s product.
Figure 9 illustrates the determination of the monopolistic equilibrium
region’s border.
The steeper, downward-sloping, thin line delineates the region corre-
sponding to what we have called a "small quality diﬀerential." The less steep,
downward-sloping, thin line is the lower contour of the region where the mar-
gin "on the ﬁr s tu n i ts o l d "b yﬁrm H on a market monopolized by ﬁrm L
is negative. The dashed curve stands for the lower contour of the region in
which the best interior margin for ﬁrm H is negative. In case of a small qual-
ity diﬀerential area, the relevant treshold is the margin on the "ﬁrst unit".
By contrast, outside the small quality diﬀerential area, the best interior mar-
gin constitutes the relevant treshold. Therefore, the thick curve delineates
the bottom of the L-monopolistic equilibrium region.
5.3.2 Duopolistic equilibrium region
As the argument for that case is a bit long, we present it verbally rather than
in a formal proof.












Figure 9: The border of the L-monopolistic equilibrium region (M =9 )
Recall that there are only two candidate duopolistic equilibria. In order
to prove that they indeed correspond to equilibria, one has to check for each
of them that several conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) that the quantities are real numbers; that is, that the best-interior-
response curves do intersect;
(ii) that the quantities are strictly positive; that is, that the intersection
lies in the positive orthant;
(iii) that qL is less than ˜ qL, the value for which BRH might exhibit a
"jump"; that is, that the intersection of the best-interior-response curves
corresponds to an intersection of the best-(global)-response curves.
By means of an example, we ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ti ti sp o s s i b l ef o rb o t hc a n -
didates to be equilibria, along with a third, monopolistic equilibrium, even
in the case of a small quality diﬀerential. Figure 10 is for the case when












Figure 10: Three pure-strategy equilibria (M =9 .995, δ =2 .605, ε =2 .2)
a =9 .4, b =1 , xL =2 , xH =6 .4, cL =1 ;a n dcH =6 .21. That corresponds
to x =4 .2, c =3 .605, δ =2 .605, ε =2 .2.
Next, as far as condition (i) is concerned, observe from the proof of Propo-
sition 15 that the system of equations (A) and (B) does not admit a solution
if
15ε(ε − 2δ)+M
2 < 0.( 8 8 )







.( 8 9 )
As the condition above is at times less stringent than the one correspond-
ing to the existence of a monopolistic equilibrium, there is a whole range of
parameters for which a pure-strategy equilibrium simply fails to exist. Such










Figure 11: No equilibrium in pure strategies (M =9 , δ =9 , ε =1 5 )
combinations of δ and ε correspond to situations where ﬁrm H’s problem is
not concave. The best-interior-response then decreases with qL until it cor-
responds to a simple inﬂexion point of the proﬁt function, after which point
it is no longer well-deﬁned.
We illustrate this possibility with the following example, displayed on
ﬁgure 11: a =0 , b =1 , xL =4 , xH =3 4 , cL =1 , cH =1 9 . That corresponds
to x =1 9 , c =1 0 , M =9 , δ =9 ,a n dε =1 5 . The thin, rounded curve is
the locus of all points satisfying the ﬁrst-order condition. For low qL,t h e r e
are two of them, corresponding to a local minimum and a local maximum
of πH.F o r l a r g e qL, such points do no exist. The circles stand for BRH,
which exhibits a "jump" at 1.875. Clearly, the two best-response curves do
not intersect; there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.
We now check conditions (ii) and (iii) for the only stable, duopolistic







15ε(ε − 2δ)+M2 − M
10ε
.( 9 0 )
Intersection in the positive orthant Even if the best-interior-response
curves intersect, the intersection may lie outside the positive orthant. As it
is not possible for q∗
L and q∗
H to be both negative, one only needs to check
that z∗ ∈ (0,1). We have to distinguish several cases.
If ε =2 δ,t h e nz∗ = 1
2, and the intersection always lies in the positive
orthant.
If ε>2δ,t h e nz∗ > 1
2 and we must ensure that
0 <
p





,( 9 1 )




.( 9 2 )
This condition is always satisﬁed when δ>0.
If ε<2δ,t h e nz∗ < 1
2 and we must ensure that
0 >
p





.( 9 3 )




.( 9 4 )
This condition is the reverse of the one delineating the border of the mo-
nopolistic equilibrium region. Therefore, for ε ≤ M
5 , a monopolistic and a
duopolistic equilibrium characterized by z∗ cannot co-exist. If M − 5ε<0,
then the condition is always satisﬁed.
Intersection left of the non-convexity in BRH Even if the best-interior-
response curves do intersect in the positive orthant, their intersection might
not lie on the best-global-response curves. We thus have to check that it
takes place left of the possible "jump" in BRH. In the case of a small quality
diﬀerential, BRH is a non-increasing, continuous function of qL.A st h et w o
41continuous best-response curves must then intersect, a pure-strategy equilib-
rium always exists. If δ<M−ε
3 ,w ea l s oh a v eqM
L <ρ L and qM
H <ρ H,a n d
this equilibrium must be duopolistic. In that case, (q∗
L,q∗
H) lies in the posi-
tive orthant. It must be an equilibrium then, since by Corollary 8 (q∗∗
L ,q∗∗
H)
cannot be an equilibrium without (q∗
L,q∗
H) being an equilibrium as well.
The non-convexity issue arises only in the case of a large diﬀerential.
Observe that the non-convexity in BRH then occurs at ˜ qL =
(a+xH−cH)2
4b(xH−xL) ,a t








.F i r m
H’s market share at this point is given by
˜ z =1−
M + ε − δ
4ε
.( 9 5 )
(q∗
L,q ∗
H)lies to the left of the non-convexity only if z∗ ≥ ˜ z.
We have
z
∗ − ˜ z =




.( 9 6 )
It is possible to show that this quantity is always positive, so that this con-
straint never binds: (q∗
L,q∗
H) never lies right of the "jump" in BRH.
We thus conclude with the following statement.
Proposition 12 When δ>0, (q∗
L,q∗
H) is a pure-strategy duopolistic equilib-
rium if and only if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) δ ≤ ε
2 + M2
30ε;
(ii) if ε ≤ M
5 and ε<2δ,t h e n δ<M−ε
3 .
5.4 Summary
We can now summarize our ﬁndings regarding the existence and nature of
stable pure-strategy Nash equilibria with ﬁgure 12 (drawn to scale for the
case where M =9 ).
The quality diﬀerential, ε, is on the horizontal axis. The cost diﬀerential,
δ, is on the vertical axis.
The downward-sloping line marked with circles delineates the small qual-
ity diﬀerential area. The thick, downward-sloping line that is the closest
to the bottom of the ﬁgure is the border between the H-monopolistic equi-
librium region and the duopolistic equilibrium region. Left of the vertical,










Figure 12: A typical equilibrium map (M =9 )
dashed line, this region extends upward until the thin, parallel, downward-
sloping line is reached. Right of the vertical line, it extends until the dotted
curve is reached. The thick, non-monotone curve is the border between the
L-monopolistic equilibrium region and the duopolistic equilibrium region.
The two latter curves are tangent to each other exactly on the vertical line.
Letting the quality diﬀerential increase from that point, they delineate a
region where the duopolistic and the L-monopolistic region co-exist.
The three most noticeable features of the model are the following.
First, the border of the L-monopolistic area is not monotone. When the
quality diﬀerential is large, the high-quality ﬁrm can restablish its margin by
ﬂooding the market and driving quality and price up. Thus, ﬁrm L needs a
big cost advantage in order to force ﬁrm H’s shut-down.
Second, when the quality diﬀerential and the cost diﬀerential are of the
43same large order of magnitude, two stable equilibria in pure strategies coexist:
one duopolistic equilibrium and one L-monopolistic equilibrium. In eﬀect,
the nature of the interection between the two ﬁrms is akin to a battle-of-the-
sexes game: either the ratio of qH over qL is low and so are price and quality;
or the ratio of qH over qL is high and so are price and quality.
Third, when the quality diﬀerential and the cost diﬀerential are very
large, a pure-strategy equilibrium may fail to exit. This outcome is the
combination of the discontinuity in ﬁrm H’s optimal-response behavior and
the non-monotonicity of ﬁrm L’s optimal-response behavior. In terms of the
usual best-reply dymanics, this is a classical instance of cycling. If H exits,
then L wants to exert its monopoly power and restrict output. Given this
low output, H wants to re-enter and being a large quantity to the market,
driving quality and price up. L then wants to take advantage of the high
margins and increase its output, forcing H’s exit.
6 Welfare considerations
Rather than carrying out a detailed welfare analysis, our aim in this sec-
tion is to underline the important aspects in which our strategic-quantity-
setting model may depart from the conventional wisdom about the provision
of quality in an environment with asymmetric information. We ﬁrstly show
by means of an example that strategic behavior can mitigate the adverse
selection problem. Secondly, we compare consumer surplus in two diﬀerent
situations to show that buyers can potentially beneﬁtf r o mt h ev a r i a t i o ni n
quality at the producer level.
6.1 Market unraveling
Recall that when the cost disparity does not assume extreme values, there
always exists a duopolistic equilibrium. So, in our setting where producers
recognize that they have an impact on the market price, in contrast with the
market for lemons, the market for melons does not completely unravel and
high-quality products continue being supplied.
Consider the following lemons example, which involves only two types of
products. To facilitate the comparison with our model, we assume that the
good is perfectly divisible. Producers choose the quantity of cars they oﬀer
for sale. Producer H has cars whose use she values at cH. Producer L has
44cars whose use she values at cL <c H. Under this constant-returns-to-scale





0 if p<c L
any positive number if p = cL
∞ if p>c L





0 if p<c H
any positive number if p = cH
∞ if p>c H
.( 9 8 )
Am a s sΘ+a of consumers, indexed by θ, is uniformly distributed over a
closed interval [−Θ,a]. We assume that Θ is suﬃciently high for the demand
curve beloew not to exhibit a kink. θ stands for the "baseline" (dis)utility
derived from owning a car of quality zero (a loss). Consumers all have the
same willingness to pay for quality improvements. That is, consumer θ’s
utility from buying car i at price p is given by
U (xi,p;θ)=θ + xi − p.( 9 9 )
There is no utility derived from consuming more than one car and the utility
from not owning any car is equal to zero. Consumers maximize expected
utility so that when quality is not observable the inverse demand curve is
given by
P = a +¯ x − Q. (100)
Let us make the assumption that consumers derive more utility from owning
the cars than the sellers, and the more so for high-quality cars. Let us have
xL = αcL, (101)
xH = βcH, (102)
with 1 <α<β . Observe that
xH − cH =( β − 1)cH > (α − 1)cL = xL − cL (103)
It is thus clear that maximizing total surplus requires H cars to be sold to
those consumers for which θ ≥− (β − 1)cH.
If the producers are price-takers, then the unique competitive equilibrium
is given by:
p
c = cL. (104)
Q
c = a +( α − 1)cL. (105)
45That is, all consumers for which θ ≥− (α − 1)cL buy a "lemon". This of
course an instance of adverse selection. Less consumers buy and they get the
wrong car, so to speak. The example makes clear that the phenomenon does
not arise from the fact that producers make a binary decision to oﬀer a given
capacity or not. On the contrary, it is driven by the price-taking behavior of
the sellers.
By contrast, if the gap between cL and cH is not too pronounced, the
previous analysis showed that ﬁrm H will not withdraw from the market if it
and ﬁrm L strategically set their quantity. Moreover, for α or
β
α high enough,
we have ε>2δ,a n dﬁrm H will actually dominate the market.
This said, on one hand, there is no value of β and α for which ﬁrm H can
enjoy a monopoly position in equilibrium (as this would require cH −cL < 0,
contrary to our assumption). On the other hand, if cH − cL is high enough,
there might be a L-monopolistic equilibrium that is worse (in terms of wel-
fare) than the competitive equilibrium because ﬁrm L will exert its monopoly
power. So, there is a sense in which strategic quantity-setting mitigates the
adverse selection issue without solving it completely for relatively small cost
diﬀerentials (but exacerbates it for large ones).
This result is an example of the well-known result in second-best the-
ory according to which two market distorsions may be preferable to only
one. Here, endowing the two competitors with some market power is a way
to alleviate the problems generated by the information asymmetry between
buyers and sellers.
6.2 Consumer surplus
An interesting way of looking at the stable duopolistic equilibrium outcome




2(a +¯ x∗) − (2c)
3b
(106)
Plugging this into the demand curve:
P
∗ =
a +¯ x∗ +( 2 c)
3
(107)
These expressions are identical to the ones in standard Cournot model, with
t h ed o u b l ec a v e a tt h a tt h ee q u i l i b r i u ma v e r a g eq u a l i t y ,¯ x, is endogenously
46determined in our model, and that c =( cH + cL)/2=[ µ(xH)+µ(xL)]/2
depends upon the speciﬁcation of qualities, for a given marginal cost function
µ.
Call the situation where consumers face two producers of diﬀerent quali-
ties xL and xH, Situation 1. Suppose that (q∗
L,q ∗
H) is the unique equilibrium.
(That is, suppose that the cost diﬀerential is not extreme.) Consumer surplus
is straightforwardly computed:
CS1 =




where c1 =[ µ(xH)+µ(xL)]/2.
Imagine that, instead of facing the two ﬁrms producing xL and xH,c o n -
sumers were in Situation 2, facing two identical ﬁrms producing the average
quality x. Then, consumer surplus would be
CS2 =









Clearly, there are numerous instances in which CS1 will be greater than CS2.
For a given quality diﬀerential, all that is required is that the function µ be
not "too convex" (or concave enough). In fact, if µ is a linear function of
quality with µ0 < 1/2, then the inequality holds for any quality diﬀerential.
Indeed, in that case, ﬁrm H produces more than ﬁrm L (for 2δ<ε ), so that
¯ x>x ,a n d[µ(xH)+µ(xL)]/2=µ(x) by linearity. This is true, in particular,
if marginal cost is constant, as in the case when quality impacts only ﬁxed
costs.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have analyzed a generalization of the Cournot duopoly game where ﬁrms
produce diﬀerent qualities but products cannot be distinguished by con-
sumers, whose willingness to pay for the good depends upon the average
quality.
47We have shown that when the quality diﬀerential is small, the game is
a continuous deformation of the standard Cournot game, in the sense that
there always exists a unique pure-strategy equilibrium. If the low-quality
ﬁrm is at a large cost disadvantage, then the high-quality ﬁrm is a monopoly
in equilibrium. If the low-quality ﬁrm is at a large cost advantage, then it
enjoys monopoly in equilibrium. If it is on the par or so with its competitor,
then both ﬁrms remain active in equilibrium.
When the quality diﬀerential is large, however, the two quantities are not
always strategic substitutes and the high-quality ﬁrm’s best-response curve
may exhibit a "jump". As a result, a pure-strategy equilibrium may fail to
exist, or two or three equilibria may co-exist, which raises an equilibrium
selection issue. To this end, we argued that when the equilibrium is not
unique, there are only two stable equilibria: one in which the low-quality
ﬁrm produces its monopoly output and the high-quality ﬁrm withdraws from
t h em a r k e t ;a n da n o t h e ro n ei nw h i c ht h eh i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm dumps a high
quantity on the market and thus sustain high levels of quality and price.
In these circumstances, we would expect the high-quality ﬁrm, operating in
a more complicated, multi-stage game, to take steps in order to shape the
industry expectations, or commit in advance to produce high quantities, so
as to end up in the duopolistic equilibrium.
Because the high-quality ﬁrm has the possibility of impacting the average
quality (and therefore consumers’ willingness to pay for the good) through
a rise in its quantity, the range of parameters for which an L-monopolistic
equilibrium exists ﬁrst enlarges, then shrinks with the quality diﬀerential.
However large the quality diﬀerential, there always exists a (vanishing) range
of cost parameters for which the high-quality ﬁrm would have entered the
market if guaranteed a monopoly position but is evicted by the low-quality
ﬁrm in equilibrium. In the special case where marginal costs are equal, the
high-quality ﬁrm’s market share is capped by a constant that is independent
of the quality diﬀerential. In other words, when quality upgrades necessitate
ﬁxed investments, there is no way for a top-quality ﬁrm to prevent a lower-
quality competitor from beneﬁting from these investments.
In all cases where the cost diﬀerential is not extreme, there exists a stable
equilibrium in which both ﬁrms remain active. This is in sharp contrast
with the well-known unraveling of markets under asymmetric information
and price-taking behavior. It is the sense in which strategic quantity-setting
can be said to help mitigate adverse selection problems. This result has direct
implications for policy-making as it suggests that a planner (or an anti-trust
48authority) might come to regard the horizontal concentration of same-quality
producers as a way to prevent the disappearance of high-quality products.
As a matter of fact, in our model the high-cost ﬁrm ends up producing
more than the low-cost ﬁrm if it enjoys a suﬃciently large quality advan-
tage. On the basis of consumer surplus, consumers may thus prefer facing
two producers of unequal qualities to facing two identical producers, since
in equilibrium the average quality can increase more than the price. We
speculate that this result coud be reproduced under mild risk aversion.
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